Citizenship, Immigration, Welfare: An Analysis of the Scandinavian Countries

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Abstract
In the 20th century advanced industrial countries of the West faced with the challenge of providing full economic, political and civil rights to the millions of post-Second World War migrant workers and their families. The challenge was twofold: For the host countries the challenge was how to accept migrant workers as permanent settlers and provide their integration into the host country’s economic, social and political system. For the migrant workers the challenge was how to achieve social justice, respect and fair treatment for themselves and their families without having to pay an unacceptable price in terms of compromising their national identities and cultural heritage. This study investigates how this twofold problem was handled within the tradition of Scandinavian welfare state. An analysis of the solutions offered by the Scandinavian countries in the form of humanitarian and generous policies and practices towards migrant workers may provide a good example to other countries struggling with the same problem.

Keywords: Immigration, migrant workers, political rights, Scandinavian countries.

1. Introduction
Leuprecht argued in 1988 that ‘the situation of aliens or foreigners seems to be one of the most serious, and at the same time most widespread, departures from the principle of the universality of human rights and one of the most manifest signs of intolerance and discrimination in our age’. The worldwide immigration problem which is triggered by hunger, famine, poverty, civil war, expectation of better living standards created thousands of migrants coming to the economically and politically more stable western countries, mainly to the USA, Canada, and the EU. In migration contexts, citizenship marks a distinction between members and outsiders based on their different relations to particular states.

Citizenship has undergone a big transformation from a purely ethnic understanding towards a civic one. While in the former citizenship rights are acquired by birth, through blood, in the latter all members of the society, regardless of their ethnicity or race, are equal citizens and equal before law. But still in the international arena ‘citizenship serves as a control device that strictly limits state obligations towards foreigners and permits governments to keep them out, or remove them, from their jurisdiction’. As a result, many foreign residents remain in most countries deprived of the core rights of political participation.

The evolution of the political rights to the migrant workers has been a long and complicated process. Since the 1970s, the issue of granting voting rights in municipal elections to resident non-nationals, both European Union nationals and third-country nationals, has been on the European political agenda. While the Scandinavian countries are already willing to incorporate the migrant workers into the political life, some European countries like Germany and France are hesitant and timid to introduce these rights. 17 European states (Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania,...

2 ibid., p.1
3 ibid., p.40

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Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, six cantons in Switzerland, and the United Kingdom) allow some categories of resident non-nationals to participate in local elections. 8 of these states, i.e. Denmark, Hungary, Norway, Portugal, Slovakia, Sweden, six cantons in Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, allow non-nationals (EU nationals and third-country nationals) to vote in elections for regional or national representative bodies. 5 of these states, i.e. Belgium, Estonia, Hungary, Luxembourg, and Slovenia, do not allow third-country nationals to stand as candidates in municipal elections. There are 12 European states (Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Malta, Poland, and Romania) that do not allow any voting rights in local elections.5

Scandinavian countries are generous in granting political rights to migrant workers on a wide spectrum as oppose to some countries granting only limited rights. For instance, although the right to freedom of expression is constitutionally guaranteed to migrants on the same conditions as nationals in most countries, rights to freedom of association and assembly are not afforded the same level of official protection and are subject to legal restrictions6. The Scandinavian countries not only grant electoral rights to migrants, but also grant them the right of freedom of association and actively encourage them to use this right. They are also the earliest examples to grant immigrants right to vote and right to stand for election for local and regional elections, at a time when it was not possible in most European countries. More interestingly, they took these efforts not due to any obligation arising from international conventions or due to any pressure from the sending countries, but only on the grounds of humanitarianism, which is spread to every aspect of life in these countries.

Sweden was classified first among the 28 countries that were studied for the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) published in 20077. This study evaluated policies, legislations and practices of 25 EU Member States, Canada, Norway and Switzerland, and ranks countries according to the policies that promote best integration in European societies. Sweden came first for best practices in all areas that were part of the study: labour market access; family reunion; long-term residence; political participation; access to nationality; and anti-discrimination. It scored 100% on best practices, on the basis of MIPEX criteria, in labour market access, including for the rights associated with it8.

Sweden’s political participation rights for migrant workers were also defined as best practices: ‘Any legal resident of three years can vote in regional and local elections and stand for local elections. They can join political parties and form their own associations, which can receive public funding or support at all levels of governance. The State actively informs migrants of these rights and does not place any further conditions on rights, funding or support’9.

In this respect, analysis of the Scandinavian countries’ immigration policies is of relevance. This study focuses on mainly Sweden and Norway as the best practices of generous and humanitarian policies for immigrants. A detailed and comparative analysis of these countries and the development of their immigration policies reveal a good example to other western countries.

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5 Groenendijk, Kees (2008) Local Voting Rights for Non-Nationals in Europe: What We Know and What We Need to Learn, Migration Policy Institute, p.3-4
7 MIPEX (Migrant Integration Policy Index), British Council and Migration Policy Group, 2007, p.4 (Source: http://www.integrationindex.eu)
8 ibid, p.172
9 ibid, p.173
2. Theoretical Battlefield: Citizenship, Nationalism, Immigration, Welfare

Theorists such as Benedict Anderson see national identity as a ‘deep and horizontal comradeship’\(^\text{10}\). National identity is a cultural norm that reflects emotional or affective orientations of individuals toward their nation and national political system. Brown explains that ‘national identification by itself is the most consistent predictor of xenophobic attitudes’\(^\text{11}\). He also argues that this identification can take both positive and negative directions, i.e. ‘ingroup love’ and ‘outgroup hate’. Based on the social psychology, immigration is perceived by societal forces as a threat to established visions of identity and societal integrity.

Geddes argues that ‘there are strong associations between immigrant policies in European countries of immigration and European nation states as political authorities regulating entry to the territory (sovereignty) and membership of the community (citizenship)’. The national organizational contexts and self-understandings affect the perceptions of immigrant ‘others’ and thus the chances for their ‘integration’\(^\text{12}\). Patterns of inclusion and exclusion are mediated in arenas (nationality laws, welfare states, labour markets) where clear national particularities and cross-cutting factors presenting similar dilemmas to European countries of immigration do exist together\(^\text{13}\).

Institutions, laws and policies to regulate immigration are often said to be based on conceptions of national identity. If national identity means self-definition and belonging in the national polity, then immigration cuts to the heart of this concept, because it raises political questions about how the nation-state should be defined. Immigration policy determines who should belong to the nation-state (and who should be excluded), and determines the very nature of that belonging by establishing the criteria for entrance, expulsion, settlement and naturalization. Kostakopoulou explains that ‘there is a close connection between the ways a polity responds to the challenge of migration and its values, collective understandings and institutions’\(^\text{14}\). In post-war Europe, nation-states chose widely differing immigration policies, from the assimilationism of French republicanism and its colonially based immigration policy, to the ethno-citizenship of Germany and its guest-worker model. Since national identity is embedded in political institutions, many scholars have located the origins of these particular immigration policies in the national identities of their respective countries.

Citizenship has undergone a big transformation from a purely ethnic understanding towards a civic one. While in the former, citizenship rights are acquired by birth, through blood, in the latter all members of the society, regardless of their ethnicity or race, are equal citizens and equal before law. But still in the international arena ‘citizenship serves as a control device that strictly limits state obligations towards foreigners and permits governments to keep them out, or remove them, from their jurisdiction’\(^\text{15}\). Nationality laws determine the conditions in which citizenship is transmitted, acquired or lost. Therefore, they define the degree of incorporation of the migrant population that is permanently settled in the country. As a result, many foreign residents remain in most countries deprived of the core rights of political participation.

There are three dimensions in the study of citizenship rights of migrants. Bauböck\(^\text{16}\) explains them as such: ‘There are first, citizenship as a political and legal status, second, legal rights and duties attached to this status, and third, individual practices, dispositions and identities attributed to, or expected from

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\(^{13}\) ibid., p.24


\(^{16}\) ibid.
those who hold the status’. The focus of this study is the political rights and practices of migrant workers in Scandinavian countries. The political rights of migrant workers is defined here as ‘a right to political activity and a general right to participate in the decision-making process concerning their interests, including the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in local elections’\textsuperscript{17}.

Immigration policy usually comprises ‘a set of legal measures that regulate the entry and stay of foreigners in the country as well as their deportation and exclusion’. It also specifies ‘their rights and obligations and it may include provisions on border control, internal security, illegal immigration, sanctions, support and assistance, i.e. accommodation centres’\textsuperscript{18}.

Inevitably there are a number of barriers or gates that control the access of potential immigrants to West European states: (1) admission; (2) permanent residence; (3) naturalization. Associated with each of these gates are larger number of rights and fewer restrictions. Once a person has lived in a country for a certain period, he can apply for permanent residence and an employment permit free of restrictions. Once this is achieved, the migrant worker gains most of the rights -civil, social and industrial- that are enjoyed by citizens. Usually the major restriction is the lack of political rights, especially voting rights in local and national elections. They are also banned from being candidates in local and national elections and are often forbidden from belonging to political parties. In order to obtain full political rights, the non-citizen migrant worker must pass through the final gate to citizenship through the process of naturalization. The willingness of host countries to grant citizenship to migrant workers varies considerably.

States that have granted voting rights to third-country nationals use four kinds of conditions to restrict that right\textsuperscript{19}:

1. Duration of residence: The duration of residence required varies between 3 years in Denmark, Estonia, Norway, Portugal, and Sweden and 5 years in Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Ireland and the United Kingdom do not have a residence requirement.

2. Registration or application: Several states require non-national voters to register with the local authorities. In Ireland and the United Kingdom, a simple registration is sufficient, while Belgium requires non-citizens to file an application for registration and to sign a declaration pledging respect to the Belgian Constitution and legislation.

3. A specific residence status: Five states, i.e. Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, grant voting rights only to third-country nationals who have a permanent residence permit or long-term residence status.

4. Reciprocity (meaning that nationals of country A can vote in country B only if nationals of country B can vote in country A): The Czech Republic, Malta, Portugal, and Spain apply this condition\textsuperscript{20}.

When a government grants voting rights to non-nationals, it makes a visible commitment to the public inclusion and equal treatment of immigrants. Within different states opinions vary on how much immigrant inclusion is desirable and which values are essential for the state’s identity\textsuperscript{21}.

Schierup, Hansen and Castles, political sociologists of work, migration and ethnic studies, examine the interactions between immigration policies and welfare state policies concentrating especially on conditions of the working poor, undocumented migrant workers, contract labourers and asylum seekers. They frame this relation as a dual crisis, namely ‘that of the established welfare state facing a declining capacity to maintain equity’\textsuperscript{22}.

\textsuperscript{19} Groenendijk, Kees (2008) Local Voting Rights for Non-Nationals in Europe: What We Know and What We Need to Learn, Migration Policy Institute, p.4
\textsuperscript{20} ibid., p.5
\textsuperscript{21} ibid., p.5
Schierup et al. are particularly concerned with the social consequences of excluding migrant groups from full citizenship, such as the creation of dual welfare and labour market systems. They analyse immigration through the lenses of the domestic labour market and welfare policies. They question whether immigration is a cause of the welfare state’s declining capacity to maintain equity. Indeed, there are many empirical studies showing a positive rather than a negative effect on the welfare state. Immigration may depress wages and native employment levels in the short term, especially for unskilled workers or first-job seekers, probably owing to the rigidity of European labour markets; but over a longer time period the impact of immigration on wages and employment is positive.

3. History of Immigration to Europe and the Citizenship Rights

Geddes explains that there are three periods of migration to Western Europe since the Second World War:

(1) Primary labour migration between the 1950s and 1973-4 was driven by the exigencies of west European economic reconstruction.

(2) Secondary/ family migration accelerated in the mid-1970s as migration for purposes of family reunion became the main form of immigration to Europe. Much of the political debate about immigration in the 1970s and 1980s centred on family migration and the implications of permanent settlement.

(3) The third wave of migration developed in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War in 1989-90 with an increase in asylum seeking migration. This has contributed to a diversification of the countries of origin of international migrants and the numbers of European countries affected by international migration.

In the 1950s and 1960s the immigration inflow was considered to be a temporary phenomenon caused by the post-war boom in the West European economy and the struggle for independence in many European colonies. It was widely assumed that most of the Turks, Moroccans, Algerians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, Caribbeans, West Africans and other Third World migrants would eventually return to their native countries. The few who would decide to settle would integrate in the receiving society; there would be a period of accommodation and adaptation, but integration and assimilation into the native population would take place in the long-term. However, these initial expectations did not conform to the reality.

The first generation of post-war immigrants was predominantly concerned with finding work and earning money for the benefit of themselves and their families. So, they were not too concerned about rights to participate in the institutions and processes of their country of residence. However, the growth of the second generation born and brought up in the host countries raised the question of political rights, identity and citizenship. The western European welfare states found the situation increasingly difficult to cope with because ‘the benefits of the welfare state are normally restricted to citizens, and non-citizens may be wholly or partially excluded’.

Therefore, individual countries of Western Europe reacted differently to this challenge. In most countries -Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain and Switzerland- foreign residents did not have the right to vote or run for office in local, regional or national elections. In Germany, the right of foreign residents to form political parties is restricted; the political party leaders and the majority of party members must be German citizens. In France, before 1981, non-nationals wishing to establish associations had to obtain prior permission from the Ministry of the Interior, and although the law was changed placing aliens on an equal footing with nationals, the aliens still observe a certain...

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moderation in political affairs. In practice, however, rights to freedom of association and assembly are liberally extended to aliens in most European countries. From the onset of the immigration inflow the Scandinavian countries granted foreign citizens the right to vote at the local level and regional level. In Sweden, the right of foreigners to freedom of association is even actively encouraged and foreign organizations flourish with the support of the state.

Regarding the treatment of immigrant workers as equal to the national workers or not, European countries differ widely. Franchino distinguishes European countries into two groups and analyses how migrants have been incorporated into national systems accordingly. He argues that since the late 1980s five old immigration countries (Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, Germany and Sweden) and five new immigration ones (Spain, Portugal, Norway, Greece and Italy) have eased recourse to temporary employment. The impact of these reforms on foreign-born workers differs across these two groups of countries. Although immigrants represent a growing share of the labour force and display rising participation rates, their working conditions are worse. The share of temporary employment in total employment is higher for foreign-born than for native-born workers (OECD/SOPEMI 2007:75–76), but this difference is four times higher in new than in old immigration countries. The liberalization of labour markets has had a distinctly different impact on how migrants have been incorporated in these two groups of countries.

4. History of Immigration to Scandinavian Countries

Sweden, Norway and Denmark formed the Nordic Passport Union in the 1950s and allowed Nordic nationals to freely work and live in any Nordic country. Finland and Iceland joined in 1965. The ‘Scandinavian labour market cooperation’ soon became a model of how individuals can work, study and travel with the same rights they enjoy at home. Indeed, Stanley Anderson argued that ‘the passport union, creation of a common labour market, and the reciprocal extension of social security are three important successes of Scandinavian intergovernmental cooperation’.

In the 1970s Scandinavian countries met with a big wave of immigration inflow mostly from the developing countries. Although Norway, Finland and Iceland got through safely from this immigration inflow due to their lag in industrialization and the limited amount of job opportunities, Sweden and Denmark were exposed to a big inflow of immigration mainly from Turkey, Pakistan, former Yugoslavia, Iran, Iraq, Vietnam, Poland, Lebanon and Somalia. These immigrants came in the form of guest or foreign workers and in the form of refugees escaping the wars, civil wars or unfavourable political situation in their countries.

The main reason of this sudden boom of immigration was the high economic growth enjoyed by Denmark and Sweden in the 1950s and 1960s. In Denmark, for instance, GDP increased by 5.3% a year in the period 1957-1965, and by 4.4% from 1965-1970, and unemployment remained low in this time period averaging between 2% and 4%, which was effectively full employment. This high level growth demanded in turn a larger workforce. Therefore, Denmark and Sweden, similar to other West European countries, started importing manpower, at first from Turkey and former Yugoslavia, and later from Pakistan.

For Scandinavian citizens until those years the only legacy of integration was with the culturally and linguistically distinct Sami population living primarily in areas above the Arctic Circle. Yet these

27 ibid, p.370
31 ibid.
newer immigrants inhabited the largest cities, and introduced debates over multiculturalism, language policy, religious rights and racial tolerance. Scandinavian countries were unprepared for the large influx of different languages, religions and cultures, and the cultural barriers to entry were particularly high. Legally all citizens were treated equal, but with the influx of new groups, the politicization of equal treatment and how it should be applied intensified. The Scandinavian welfare state had enjoyed a long economic and social success, but the entrance of new immigrants to the society posed a big challenge to the legitimacy of the welfare state. Immigrants were treated under the law as equal members of the society and entitled to the same benefits as all other Scandinavians. For example, in 1974 one-fourth of the work force of many industrial plants in Sweden was foreign born, and these workers were guaranteed economic and social equality by both political and trade-union organizations.32 Even when hard times fell upon Denmark and Sweden in the mid-1970s entrance was restricted, but those already in residence enjoyed full protection.

In the 1980s Scandinavian countries witnessed a flood of desperate people from the Middle East, Asia and Africa. This inflow created uneasiness among public and politicians. One argument was that public resources were severely taxed by large numbers of people from very different cultures. Moderate critics of an open-door policy feared a backlash of resentment and inadequate services. There was also the perception that newcomers do not invest in the social welfare system over a lifetime which created an undercurrent of resentment.33 Grete Brochmann argued that ‘immigration poses a conflict between two social democratic principles: international solidarity and internal distribution of social, economic and political benefits.34 If refugee status was accorded everyone who was economically wretched and politically dissatisfied, the numbers could be staggering.35 Less liberal critics feared openly for the cultural survival of their small societies and some saw conspiracies to overwhelm Scandinavia with aggressive foreign activists.36

The 1987 Norwegian local election and 1988 Danish national election reflected these perceptions. The fringe parties running on openly xenophobic platforms increased their vote. Even a party called ‘Stop Immigration’ was founded in Norway on 15 September 1987. The party received 0.3% of the votes in 1989 parliamentary election, and 0.1% in 1993 parliamentary election. In the 1995 election, it had in its program to relinquish the Geneva Convention, don’t let any refugees and asylum seekers into the country, and use the funds allocated for foreign aid to send foreigners back home. Additionally, a study conducted by the Norwegian Social Science Data Service (NSD) about the fear of the immigrants on the society revealed very interesting results. In 1988 46% of those polled attributed higher levels of crime and violence in society to immigrants; in 1994 67% shared this opinion. Those who are unemployed are more hostile to immigrants, according to the same report, due to the fear of losing their job to the immigrant workers.

5. Political Rights of Immigrants in Scandinavian Countries

Political rights are defined in Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) as ‘the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs, the right of equal access to the public...

34 ibid.
36 ibid, p.36
37 In 1987 Norwegian municipal election the Progress Party increased its vote by 5.1%, and in the county election increased its vote by 6%. In 1988 Danish parliamentary election the Progress Party added 7 more seats in Parliament.
38 Norwegian Social Science Data Service, Report 1994, Oslo, p.10

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service, and the right to vote and to be elected to political office. The first political rights to non-nationals were introduced within the Nordic Union. In 1977 the Nordic Council adopted a recommendation stating that Nordic citizens residing in other Nordic states should be able to vote. In 1977, Sweden granted local voting rights to all non-nationals with three years of residence. Denmark and Finland followed suit the same year, with Denmark extending local voting rights to all non-national residents in 1981 and Finland doing the same in 1991. Norway granted local voting rights to Nordic nationals in 1978 and to all non-nationals in 1985.

**Sweden:**

Swedish authorities react to the permanent immigration by ushering immigrants as swiftly as possible from denizenship to citizenship. Sweden was not a large-scale recruiter of migrant workers until the 1960s. The main sources of recruitment were Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia. With the unexpected arrival of workers from Yugoslavia in 1965, Aliens Decree was issued. This specified that in order to enter Sweden, migrants needed to apply for a work permit in their country of origin. In 1968, guidelines to regulate migration were issued and the Swedish Immigration Board was established with responsibility both for regulating migration and the integration of immigrants.

Labour migration reached its peak in 1969-70. The Swedish trade unions accepted immigration so long as migrants workers were entitled the same conditions as other workers. Immigrants also received the same social benefits as Swedes including unemployment benefit. This welfare state reception was in line with the rapid acceptance of permanent immigration and was accompanied by liberal nationality laws. Sweden explicitly pursued an immigration policy rather than a guest-worker paradigm. After 1-2 years in Sweden migrants could establish permanent resident status with the rights of denizenship and after 5 years they could become Swedish citizens.

However, expansive recruitment policies ended during the economic recession in 1972. The trade unions were worried about labour migration’s impact on salaries and working conditions of their members. In 1973 a new law forced all employers of any foreign worker to pay 400 hours of full salary for Swedish language classes. All these attempts closed the immigration door to Sweden except for the free movement for people from Nordic Council states.

Sweden is one of those European countries that made great strides in granting electoral rights to migrants. In 1975 Sweden granted immigrants, who have legally resided in Sweden for a minimum of three years, the right to vote and to stand for election for local and regional elections. For Hammar, this was a remarkable decision because initially the indigenous population was against it. It was not achieved as the result of a campaign by immigrants themselves. Swedish advocates professionally working with immigrants were the first to suggest the idea. The supporters of enfranchisement faced with resistance especially from juridical specialists. Surprisingly, the Social Democrats, who had been in power for decades, did not favour enfranchisement. They saw it as conflicting with a basic idea of the prevalent electoral system, i.e. the holding of all elections (on three levels) on the same day. However, the influential Social Democratic trade-union federation did favour it. In the spring of 1974, party leader Olaf Palme suddenly changed his position. This change was due to the introduction of the new immigration policy adopted at the same time. For him, the granting of voting rights exactly coincided with the new

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40 Groenendijk, Kees (2008) *Local Voting Rights for Non-Nationals in Europe: What We Know and What We Need to Learn*, Migration Policy Institute, p.8-9
41 ibid., p.107
42 ibid., p.108
policy goals of equality, freedom of choice and partnership. First the Social Democratic Party and later other parties followed Palme’s lead.

The electoral reform was enacted in 1975, and so in 1976 all Swedish immigrants residing in the country for more than three years were allowed to participate in *kommunfullmäktige* (local) and *landsting* (regional) elections. They were, however, still excluded from the most important *Riksdag* (parliamentary) elections.

On 15 December 2008, new rules for labour migration entered into force in Sweden. Contrary to most recent EU Member States’ modifications of labour migration laws and practice, Sweden chose to look at migration from a constructive perspective. This approach is described as follows: ‘The Government’s basic premise is that immigration helps vitalize society, the labour market and the economy, thanks to the new knowledge and experience that new arrivals bring from their home countries’\(^{45}\). Swedish Ministry of Justice underlined the link between migration and development: ‘The Government’s objective is to increase coherence between migration and development in order to strengthen the positive effects and reduce the negative effects of migration on development. The links between migration and development affect several areas, including the labour market, trade, health, education and human rights’\(^{46}\). Consequently, new immigration rules reflect this openness to migration, coupled with a needs-based approach.

**Norway:**

In the late 1960s, a combination of a booming economy and a population shortage led Norway to accept a number of labour migrants from Morocco, Yugoslavia, Turkey, and particularly Pakistan. These guest workers, though expected to be temporary, remained in the country and were eventually followed by other migrants, including refugees and family reunification candidates. As of 2001 most of the immigrant population was from Pakistan, Sweden, and Denmark, and new flows in 2004 largely came first from Sweden, then Russia, Denmark, and Poland.

Stories of migration mismanagement from other European countries, coupled with the threat of sudden increase of immigrants from developing countries, motivated the government to enact an ‘immigration stop’ in 1975. It was the first legislation to formally restrict immigration to Norway.

The Norwegian public reaffirmed its support for curbing immigration in the 1980s. There were public protests over the growing numbers of asylum seekers, whose numbers peaked during the decade at 8,600 in 1987. Electoral support for the anti-immigration Progress Party confirmed xenophobic tendencies at this time. While the party received only 3.7% of the parliamentary vote in 1985, it received 12.3 and 13.0% of the vote in 1987 and 1989 respectively.

While the Norwegian government also took into account the concerns of the native population, it also aimed to treat immigrants and native Norwegians equally, a founding principle of post-1970 immigration policies in Norway and anchored in the Immigration Act of 1988. The act provided permission of entry, a border and internal control mechanism, and a sanctions system for the cancellation of permits, rejections, and expulsions. It also instituted a settlement permit, given to individuals with three continuous years of residency\(^{47}\).

Norway’s modern migration policy is based on the idea that the welfare state, which is the characteristic feature of the Norwegian society, has limited resources. So there has been two basic principles of the Norwegian immigration policy: 1) immigration must be limited; and 2) all immigrants who are admitted to Norway should have equal legal and practical opportunities in society\(^{48}\).

\(^{45}\) Migration Policy, Fact Sheet, Ministry of Justice, March 2010 (Source: http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/14/08/34/d29dec99.pdf)

\(^{46}\) ibid.


\(^{48}\) ibid.
This latter point deserves additional description. Every White Paper since the 1970s has emphasized a respect for immigrants and their language and culture. However, over time the government has emphasized more strongly immigrants’ duty to participate and learn the Norwegian language. In the White Paper presented in 1980, Norwegian integration is focused not on assimilation, but on both adaptation to the Norwegian culture and protecting immigrants from the forces of assimilation. Another White Paper from 1988 emphasized ‘respect for immigrants’ language and culture’\textsuperscript{49}. With the White Paper of 1996-1997 the concept of integration included the obligation to participate, partly to achieve a successful multicultural society, and partly to improve the success of the welfare state. In practice, this includes measures such as language training, labour market integration, and initiatives to prevent racism and xenophobia. The 2003 Introduction Act requires the active participation in integration programs for targeted refugees between the ages of 18 and 55 by settlement municipalities.

The Immigration Act and Immigration Regulations entered into force on 1 January 2010. D’Auchamp\textsuperscript{50} explains the spirit of the law as ‘fewer but better protected’ migrant workers. She explains the key aspects of the new law as: (1) a single residence permit now replaces previous residence and work permits; (2) increased attention to the best interests of the child; (3) possibility for migrant workers to start work before the administrative process is completed; (4) tightened family reunion rules\textsuperscript{51}.

Norway granted political rights to migrant workers in a similar way to Sweden and Denmark. On 15 December 1978, Nordic immigrants were granted the vote by a constitutional amendment. When they participated for the first time in the 1979 election, the government had already promised seriously to consider extending voting rights to non-Nordic immigrants, and in 1980 it published its proposals in a white paper. The radical socialist Socialistisk Ventreparti did not wait for this paper and introduced a bill proposing voting rights for all immigrants. This premature initiative was not discussed in parliament, but nevertheless in 1982 the government and all parliamentary parties did agree to enfranchise all immigrants. Opinion diverged on the prerequisites of participation. The Conservative and Centre parties wanted a minimal residence period of seven years, but the Socialist, Social Democratic and Liberal parties preferred three years, and they constituted a majority. Immigrant associations and the trade unions took a similar view. According to a public opinion poll in April 1983, a majority of Norwegians, albeit a tiny one, supported the reform.

6. Electoral Behaviour of Immigrant Workers in Scandinavian Countries

\textit{Sweden:}

One recurrent feature of the patterns of immigrant participation is the relatively low turn-out compared to the native voters\textsuperscript{52}. Immigrant turn-out in the first immigrant elections in 1975 was about 60\% while turn-out of the native Swedes was about 90\%.\textsuperscript{53} In the following two elections the immigrant turn-out decreased to a steady 52\%-53\%, and then fell again to 48\% in the 1985 elections\textsuperscript{54}. In 2010 election to Riksdag turn-out among Swedish-background citizens was 87.5\% while turn-out among foreign-background citizens was 74.5\%.\textsuperscript{55}

Turn-out patterns vary according to age and sex. Young immigrants were more likely to abstain than older ones, while the participation of female immigrants was sometimes lower, sometimes higher

\textsuperscript{49} ibid.
\textsuperscript{50} D’Auchamp, Marie (2010) \textit{Migrant Workers’ Rights in Europe}, printed by United Nations Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner, p.51
\textsuperscript{51} ibid, p.51
\textsuperscript{53} Hammar, T. (1977) \textit{The First Immigrant Election}, Stockholm: Ministry of Labour
\textsuperscript{55} See http://www.scb.se/Statistik/ME/ME0105/2010A01/ME0105_2010_ri_tab10_eng.xls

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than that of male immigrants. It is interesting to note that in Sweden, the participation of Turkish women was relatively low at first, but later it caught up with that of men. Hammar argued that the most abstentions among the immigrants in Sweden are: ‘predominantly young immigrant workers who were rather mobile, had been in the country a relatively short time, and were still thinking of returning to their home countries’.

Table 1: Voting rates among foreign citizens by sex and age in elections to the Country Councils 2010 (voters in % of those entitled to vote)

<table>
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<th>Women</th>
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<td>28.5</td>
<td>26.5</td>
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<td>36.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-54</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-59</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-64</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65-69</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>43.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70-74</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>44.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75-79</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>34.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80-</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Electoral participation of immigrants coming from more distant countries has been higher compared with those of the Nordic immigrants. Hammar concluded that the immigrants coming from more distant countries had invested more in migrating to Sweden and that once they were settled their residence was more permanent. In the course of time, they learned Swedish, widened their contacts with native Swedes, and became familiar with Swedish institutions such as political parties and elections. Many immigrants in Sweden interpreted the right to vote as a moral duty to engage in Swedish politics.

Table 2: Voting rates among foreign citizens by sex and country of citizenship in elections to the Municipal Councils 2010 (voters in % of those entitled to vote)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of Citizenship</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>83.5</td>
<td>84.9</td>
<td>84.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Nordic countries excluding Sweden</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>40.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU27 excluding the Nordic countries</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe excluding EU27 and the Nordic countries</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>43.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>34.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

58 See http://www.scb.se/Statistik/ME/ME0105/2010A01/ME0105_2010_lf_tab7a_eng.xls
60 See http://www.scb.se/Statistik/ME/ME0105/2010A01/ME0105_2010_kf_tab4_eng.xls

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The party preference of migrant workers was mostly for the Social Democratic or Socialist parties. Immigrants vote for the Socialdemokraterna in Sweden, and for the socialist parties in Denmark. Hammar suggested that immigrants in Sweden are more inclined to vote for non-socialist parties when their period of residence is longer and their socio-economic position has improved. In other words, upward social mobility is likely to be followed by a change of party preferences.

The right to vote goes hand in hand with the right to run for office, so how immigrants fared as candidates in elections should be analysed as well. In the 1979 local elections in Sweden, immigrants comprised 8% of the total electorate and 4% of the candidates. Most occupied low positions on the lists, particularly for the non-socialist parties. Of the 13,368 councillors elected 490 (3.7%) were immigrants, but only 89 of these still held their original nationalities. In the 1979 Riksdag elections two naturalised foreigners were elected: a Greek Communist and a Finnish Socialist.

Profiles of these immigrant candidates were quite different from that of the average migrant worker. The great number of naturalised foreigners among the immigrant candidates in Sweden shows us that most immigrant candidates are part of elite with a relatively high level of ‘assimilation’. They are often people who are long settled and well established in the host society, and have mastery of the host country language. Often they are well-educated professional welfare workers, schoolteachers or businessmen. The elite of upwardly mobile immigrants are relatively small, which partially explains the under-representation of immigrants among candidates and elected representatives.

Norway:

In the municipal and county council election in 2007, 36% of foreign citizens participated. The electoral turnout was low both among foreign citizens with Western and non-Western immigrant background. While 28% of those with non-Western background voted, 42% of those with Western background voted. Danish and German citizens had the highest turnout with 48%, while citizens from Serbia and Bosnia had the lowest turnout with 16 and 18% respectively. Eastern European citizens generally have a low turnout with 22% on average. The turnout among non-Western citizens increased by 3% compared with 2003. With an increase of 13% to 36%, Somali citizens had the largest increase in electoral turnout. Norwegian citizens with immigrant background had a higher turnout than foreign citizens, particularly citizens with Western background. 64% of Norwegian citizens with Western background voted, which is 2% points higher than in the population as a whole. Among non-Western immigrants with Norwegian citizenship, 37% voted, an increase of 1% from the last election.

Table 3: Electoral turn-out in municipal and county election in 2007 among the foreign citizens, by citizenship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citizenship</th>
<th>Turn-out</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>38.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>29.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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62 ibid., p.145
65 ibid.
66 See http://www.ssb.no/english/subjects/00/01/20/vundkinnv_en/

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In the Storting election in 2009, 52% of Norwegian citizens with an immigrant background participated. This was lower than the whole electoral turnout at 76.4%. Electors with a background from North and Central America, and Oceania recorded the highest voter turnout with 69%. The lowest voter turnout was recorded among electors with a background from Asia, with 50%. Immigrants with a European and African background also recorded low turnouts with 53% participation. As regards Europe, the survey indicates that immigrants from Eastern Europe and Turkey have a particularly low turnout with 44 and 42% participation respectively. The voter turnout for the immigrants with an African background increased by 7% from 2005 to 2009. Only electors with a European background have experienced a 4% decrease in their participation since the election in 2005.

Since the election in 2005, the voter turnout has increased for electors with a background from Iran, Iraq and Pakistan, while it has decreased for electors with a background from Vietnam and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The highest voter turnout of these has electors of Pakistani origin with 55%, while electors of Vietnamese origin have the lowest with 36%. In total, electors with a background from these countries constitute 1/3 of all the persons with an immigrant background entitled to vote in the Storting election 2009. The immigrants with a background from Sweden and Denmark have the highest voter turnout of all immigrant groups, 81 and 79% respectively.

The age distribution and the period of residence are important factors contributing to the voter turnout. The turnout is lower in the younger age groups. The main rule has been that the older the electorate, the higher the turnout. Electoral participation increases with longer period of residence. The participation also normally increases by the period of residence. Immigrants resident for more than 30 years have the highest turnout with 69%.

Table 4: Electoral turnout in % in Storting Election in 2009 among the immigrants and Norwegian-born to immigrants with Norwegian citizenship, by sex and age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-21</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>37.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-25</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>39.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-29</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>33.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>49.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>54.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>61.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-</td>
<td>65.3</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>63.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

68 See http://www.ssb.no/english/subjects/00/01/10/vundinnv_en/
69 ibid.
70 ibid.
71 See http://www.ssb.no/english/subjects/00/01/10/vundinnv_en/tab-2010-01-14-02-en.html
7. Concluding Remarks

Since the 19th century, nationality and citizenship have been considered closely related concepts in Europe. Nationality suggests membership of a nation which is a body of people distinguished by common descent, language, culture or historical tradition. Citizenship refers to the members of a state, i.e. those people being, or having, the rights and duties of a citizen. Citizenship is thus the legal definition of those people with citizenship rights.

The migration and settlement of millions of foreign migrant workers has challenged these traditional notions of citizenship, nationality and membership of a nation state. The realisation that migrant workers are becoming permanent settlers without applying for citizenship through naturalisation has created a novel situation - a situation that is a challenge to theories of representative democracy. The presence of large numbers of residents, who are excluded from political decision-making, means that representative government is no longer truly representative. This is especially true at the local level, where, in some municipalities a large proportion is expanding because of continued immigration, the family reunification, the youthfulness of the immigrant population and the high birth-rates.

Therefore, presence of large semi-settled foreign minorities in Western societies started to be perceived as an added complication in the government of these states. The lack of political rights has led to a thesis of political quiescence. Migrant workers are portrayed as an apolitical mass whose apathy and inferior political status weakens the working class politically and industrially. There is also a perception that migrant workers who are interested in politics would be more concerned with the politics of their homeland than that of their new country of residence. However, not everybody agrees that migrant workers are a passive political force. Some groups on the extreme left see migrant workers as a potentially revolutionary vanguard precisely because they are not integrated into the political system. The native working class are often compromised, from a revolutionary point of view, by allegiances to established social democratic and labour parties either through membership of unions affiliated to these parties or directly as party members and supporters. On the political right, on the other hand, migrant workers are often seen as a threat to national unity. This perception may still be taken when they are citizens. However, the political role attributed to migrant workers by the extreme left and extreme right has received less attention than the thesis of political quiescence.

However, it was noted by scholars that there is a contradiction between the economic exploitation of immigrants and the precepts of the liberal democratic state. Giscard d’Estaing argues that even Conservative politicians are aware of this contradiction: ‘Immigrant workers, being part of our national productive community, should have a place in French society which is dignified, humane and equitable’. Therefore, European countries inclined towards the gradual extension of social, civil and political rights to migrant workers and their dependents. Restrictions on the employment and activities of foreigners have gradually been lifted, and in some countries naturalisation laws have been relaxed. Although this trend has not been uniform, and sometimes tougher policies have been introduced, generally an expansion of rights has taken place.

Ingebritsen explains two most difficult challenges facing Scandinavia today as ‘the transfer of authority away from Scandinavia to the EU and the influx of non-Scandinavian immigrants’. She argues that ‘immigration threatens Scandinavia’s ideology of social partnership which is one of the defining features of political institutions in northern Europe’. Especially as public support for anti-immigration

74 ibid., p.21
75 ibid., p.21
76 ibid., p.22
78 ibid., p.13
parties gains momentum and incidences of hate crimes receive international attention, these pose threats to Scandinavia’s reputation of being the conscience of international society. Two major Scandinavian characteristics need careful insight: how the universal welfare system incorporates the immigrants, and how the Scandinavian model plays the role of norm entrepreneur in this area.

In previous sections of this paper it was outlined that Scandinavian countries have made great strides in granting electoral rights to migrants, and the right of foreigners to freedom of association has even been actively encouraged by the state. In the Scandinavian countries and the three Benelux countries, the introduction of voting rights for the Nordic citizens and EU-citizens resulted in extending these rights to other resident non-nationals, irrespective of their nationality, either at the same time (Sweden and the Netherlands) or some years later (other five states). Groenendijk argues that “once a state broke the symbolic link between voting rights and nationality, the extension proved politically less problematic”79. These moves owe a great deal to the historical, social, economic and political roots of the welfare state, a resolute commitment to true representative democracy, and belief in the equality of all human-beings. Although xenophobic attitudes were seen in all of these countries, the biggest part of the population have never given much attention to the extremist and racist views.

Sweden has never had a system of immigration similar to the guest-worker programs of other European countries. Labour migration has never been planned on a large scale and has never been actively used as a remedy for the problems of the economy. While 1972 it limited the number of foreign workers allowed to entry, Sweden retained its belief that immigration policy should not separate the right to work from the right of residence. Therefore, foreigners in Sweden enjoyed the same social rights as Swedish citizens. As a result of comprehensive welfare policies, Hammar argues, when immigrants are compared to similar groups of Swedes, differences in matter of housing, work, income and well-being are not so great80. The studies comparing Swedes with Finns and Yugoslavs show that the immigrants’ standard of living is relatively equal to that of Swedes in the same age and occupational groups.

The two major underpinnings of Norwegian migration policy, i.e. restrictive admissions and equal treatment, have been present throughout the development of Norway into a significant reception country for migrants and asylum seekers. The result is a policy based on values that balance entrance controls with generous integration and social services for immigrant populations.

Thus Sweden and Norway provide optimistic expectations for the survival and resilience of the Scandinavian model with government policies reaching out to multicultural groups since the 1970s. Bo Rothstain predicts the continuation of universal welfare norms despite growing diversity and tension within Sweden over how the system should be reformed. For him, calls for reform are evidence that the system is responsive and adaptive. One of the most popular films in Sweden portrays a stereotypical Volvo-driving citizen who encounters an exotic, dynamic immigrant family. The humour, derived from portrayal of distinct cultures living side by side within the same society, has a healing quality that gives promise to an emerging idea of multiculturalism.

References

79 Groenendijk, Kees (2008) Local Voting Rights for Non-Nationals in Europe: What We Know and What We Need to Learn, Migration Policy Institute, p.11

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